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Correspondence Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Kenneth F. Schaffner*
Affiliation:
The University of Chicago

Abstract

The traditional role which correspondence rules, coordinating definitions, or semantical rules, have in a logical analysis of a scientific theory is questioned by providing an alternative analysis. The alternative account suggests that scientific theories are “meaningful” prior to the establishment of correspondence rules, and that correspondence rules are introduced to permit explanation and testing in the “observational” sector. The role of models is briefly assessed in connection with this prior or “antecedent theoretical meaning,” and a causal sequence analysis of a class of correspondence rules is presented which makes explicit the interdependence of scientific theories.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1969 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Research supported by the National Science Foundation.

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