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Content, Causation, and Psychophysical Supervenience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Joseph Owens
Joseph Owens*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
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Abstract

There is a growing acceptance of the idea that the explanatory states of folk psychology do not supervene on the physical. Even Fodor (1987) seems to grant as much. He argues, however, that this cannot be true of theoretical psychology. Since theoretical psychology offers causal explanations, its explanatory states must be taxonomized in such a way as to supervene on the physical. I use this concession to invert his argument and cast doubt on the received model of folk psychological explanation as causal explanation by intentionally individuated states. This in turn undermines the central model of cognitive theory—causal explanation by representational states.

I wanted to become a Napoleon—that's why I killed the old woman.

Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 242 - 261
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to R. Stalnaker and to an anonymous referee of this journal for their very valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 355 Ford Hall, 224 Church St. S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA.

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