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Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Jamin Asay
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Abstract

Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth and empirical adequacy the constructive empiricist must offer and then show why deflationists cannot uphold such an account.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 4 , October 2009 , pp. 423 - 443
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

My thanks go out to Marc Lange, Keith Simmons, and especially John Roberts, whose contributions and suggestions significantly helped shape the final form of this essay. Thanks also go to the participants of the 2006 Carolina Philosophy Retreat at Cranberry Lake, NY, who heard and offered helpful feedback on a very preliminary sketch of the ideas presented here.

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