Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T00:16:51.754Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Confirmational Significance of Agreeing Measurements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Casey Helgeson
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Agreement between “independent” measurements of a theoretically posited quantity is intuitively compelling evidence that a theory is, loosely speaking, on the right track. But exactly what conclusion is warranted by such agreement? I propose a new account of the phenomenon’s epistemic significance within the framework of Bayesian epistemology. I contrast my proposal with the standard Bayesian treatment, which lumps the phenomenon under the heading of “evidential diversity.”

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 721 - 732
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

For helpful feedback and discussion, I thank Martin Barrett, Malcolm Forster, Elliott Sober, Michael Titelbaum, Peter Vranas, and audiences at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, the London School of Economics, and the PSA 2012.

References

Bovens, L., and Hartmann, S.. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Earman, J. 1992. Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Edwards, A. W. F. 1984. Likelihood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Fitelson, B. 1999. “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity.” Philosophy of Science 66 (Proceedings): S362–S378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fitelson, B. 2001. “A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications.” Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S123–S140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forster, M. 1988. “Unification, Explanation, and the Composition of Causes in Newtonian Mechanics.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 19 (1): 55–101..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forster, M., and Sober, E.. 2011. “AIC Scores as Evidence—a Bayesian Interpretation.” In Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science 7, ed. P. S. Bandyopadhyay and M. Forster. Oxford: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Hacking, I. 1965. The Logic of Statistical Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacking, I. 1985. “Do We See through a Microscope?” In Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, ed. Churchland, P. M. and Hooker, C. A.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Helgeson, C. 2013. “Diverse Evidence, Independent Evidence, and Darwin’s Arguments from Anatomy and Biogeography.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Howson, C., and Urbach, P.. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. 2nd ed. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Koolage, J. 2008. “Realism and the Agreement of Measurements.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison.Google Scholar
Myrvold, W. C. 1996. “Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne.” Philosophy of Science 63 (4): 661–65..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myrvold, W. C. 2003. “A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Unification.” Philosophy of Science 70 (2): 399–423..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Norton, J. 2000. “How We Know about Electrons.” In After Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method, ed. Nola, R. and Sankey, H.. Boston: Kluwer Academic.Google Scholar
Royall, R. M. 1997. Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm. London: Chapman & Hall.Google Scholar
Salmon, W. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sober, E. 1989. “Independent Evidence about a Common Cause.” Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 275–87..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sober, E. 1999. “Modus Darwin.” Biology and Philosophy 14 (2): 253–78..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wayne, A. 1995. “Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence.” Philosophy of Science 62 (1): 111–21..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wheeler, G., and Scheines, R.. 2011. “Causation, Association and Confirmation.” In Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, ed. Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W. J., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., and Weber, M., 37–51. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whewell, W. 1858/1858. “Novum organon renovatum.” In William Whewell: Theory of Scientific Method, ed. Butts, R. E.. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar