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Confirmation and the Indispensability of Mathematics to Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Susan Vineberg
Susan Vineberg*
Affiliation:
Wayne State University
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Abstract

Quine and Putnam argued for mathematical realism on the basis of the indispensability of mathematics to science. They claimed that the mathematics that is used in physical theories is confirmed along with those theories and that scientific realism entails mathematical realism. I argue here that current theories of confirmation suggest that mathematics does not receive empirical support simply in virtue of being a part of well confirmed scientific theories and that the reasons for adopting a realist view of scientific theories do not support realism about mathematical entities, despite the use of mathematics in formulating scientific theory.

Type
Confirmation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3 , 1996 , pp. S256 - S263
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Larry Lombard for helpful advice on a draft of this paper. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 1995 meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association. I am grateful to my commentator, Thomas M. Norton-Smith, and to members of the audience for helpful and encouraging comments on the paper.

‡

Department of Philosophy, 51 W. Warren, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202.

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