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Concerning Mr. Feigl's “Vindication” of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Daniel Kading
Daniel Kading*
Affiliation:
University of Texas
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Extract

I wish to examine the “justification” or “vindication” of inductive procedure that has been set forth in various places by the late Professor Reichenbach and by Professor Feigl, most recently by the latter. Although Professor Feigl has explicitly referred to this kind of a “vindication” as “trivial,” it is nevertheless evident, from the stress placed upon and the space devoted to this proposal, that both Professors Feigl and Reichenbach attach considerable importance to it. Thus Professor Feigl says:

It has to be shown that the normal inductive procedure is reasonable, not merely by definition in the light of common usage, but that this definition itself is not merely a result of linguistic habituation or of an arbitrary fiat. This can be achieved, as I have tried to show..., largely in agreement with Reichenbach's ideas, if the adoption of the rule of induction is made a matter of practical justification (vindication) rather than a matter of theoretical justification (validation).

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , October 1960 , pp. 405 - 407
Copyright
Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association

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References

1 “Scientific Method without Metaphysical Presuppositions,” Philosophical Studies, 5: 17-29 (1954). A reference to the other articles dealing with this subject may be found at the end of Professor Feigl's article, pp. 28-29.

2 “De Principiis non disputandum... ? On the Meaning and the Limits of Justification” in M. Black, editor, Philosophical Analysis. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950, p. 138.

3 “Scientific Method without Metaphysical Presuppositions,” op. cit., p. 28.

4 “De Principiis non disputandum...,” op. cit., pp. 137-38. Italics in the original.

5 It would be a mistake to introduce the qualifying phrase “if success is possible” at this point. The aim is simply to make as many successful predictions as possible of the kind specified. If none can be made, the inductive method “succeeds” because it does not make any.