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Components of Probabilistic Support: The Two-Proposition Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

P. T. Landsberg  and
J. Wise
P. T. Landsberg
Affiliation:
Faculty of Mathematical Studies University of Southampton England
J. Wise
Affiliation:
Faculty of Social Sciences University of Southampton England
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Abstract

Support functions s(h,e) = p(h|e) – p(h) are widely used in discussion of explanation, causality and, recently, in connection with the possibility or otherwise of probabilistic induction. With this latter application in view, a rather complete analysis of the variety of support functions, their interrelationships and their “non-deductive” and “inductive” components is presented. With the restriction to two propositions, three variable probabilities are enough to discuss such problems. The analysis is illustrated by graphs, a Venn diagram and by using the Laplace Rule of Succession as an illustrative example. It is concluded that within this framework one cannot prove or disprove the possibility of probabilistic induction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 55 , Issue 3 , September 1988 , pp. 402 - 414
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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