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Communication by Ramsey-Sentence Clause

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Herbert G. Bohnert
Herbert G. Bohnert*
Affiliation:
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
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Abstract

F. P. Ramsey pointed out in Theories that the observational content of a theory expressed partly in non-observational terms is retained in the sentence resulting from existentially generalizing the conjunction of all sentences of the theory with respect to all nonobservational terms. Such terms are thus avoidable in principle, but only at the cost of forming a single “monolithic” sentence. This paper suggests that communication may be thought of as occurring not only by sentence but by clause, a sentential formula closed except for a special kind of variable. Understanding such clauses requires incorporating them within the scope of one's own Ramsey sentence. Many concepts of deductive and inductive logic carry over without great change. But the concepts of truth and designation are extendible to clauses only in the sense that assertions involving them must, to be understood, in turn be construed as clauses and incorporated into the Ramsey sentence. The behavior of these extended concepts of truth and designation suggests an explication of coherence truth within a correspondence-truth framework.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , December 1967 , pp. 341 - 347
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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Footnotes

†

This is a slightly revised part of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Washington, D.C., December 1963. The author wishes to thank those whose sustained interest finally elicited this publication, especially Profs. Quine, Rudner, and Scheffler. Preparation of the original paper was partly supported by The Air Force Office of Scientific Research under contract AF 49(638)-1198.

References

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