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A Clearer Vision
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content in which content does the sort of explanatory work that Egan denies is possible.
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- Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
For helpful comments and discussion I thank Tom Bontly, Berent Enç, Malcolm Forster, Gary Hatfield, Eric Saidel, Doug Smith, Elliott Sober, Denis Walsh, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal.
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