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Clark Hull, Robert Cummins, and Functional Analysis
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
Robert Cummins has recently used the program of Clark Hull to illustrate the effects of logical positivist epistemology upon psychological theory. On Cummins's account, Hull's theory is best understood as a functional analysis, rather than a nomological subsumption. Hull's commitment to the logical positivist view of explanation is said to have blinded him to this aspect of his theory, and thus restricted its scope. We will argue that this interpretation of Hull's epistemology, though common, is mistaken. Hull's epistemological views were developed independently of, and in considerable contrast to, the principles of logical positivism.
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- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984
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