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Child's Play

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Nancy J. Nersessian
Nancy J. Nersessian*
Affiliation:
School of Literature, Communication, and Culture and College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology
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Extract

Although most philosophers are not aware of it, research in cognitive development and in learning in the last decade has made considerable use of the characterizations of the nature and development of scientific knowledge proffered by philosophers of science. In a “reflexive” move, Alison Gopnik proposes philosophers of science can profit from the research of psychologists investigating cognitive development-specifically from that group of researchers who advocate the “theory theory.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 542 - 546
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Send reprint requests to the author, Georgia Institute of Technology, School of LCC, Atlanta, GA 30332–0165.

References

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