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Causing Trouble: Theories of Reference and Theory of Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

J. Robert Thompson
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Abstract

Michael and MacLeod’s paper on theories of reference for intentional concepts addresses neglected connections between theories of reference and Theory of Mind debates. Unfortunately, their paper neither shows the negative effects of descriptivism on theories of reference for intentional concepts nor provides an adequate picture of how the sort of theory they advocate might explain either the reference of intentional concepts or the puzzles of development on which they focus. In this article, I give reasons to think that the prospects are dim for applying causal approaches to the major topics raised by Michael and MacLeod.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 83 , Issue 1 , January 2016 , pp. 119 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author wishes to thank Dan Weiskopf for comments on this article.

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