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Causal Realism and the Laws of Nature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Richard Corry
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Abstract

This paper proposes a revision of our understanding of causation that is designed to address what Hartry Field has suggested is the central problem in the metaphysics of causation today: reconciling Bertrand Russell's arguments that the concept of causation can play no role in the advanced sciences with Nancy Cartwright's arguments that causal concepts are essential to a scientific understanding of the world. The paper shows that Russell's main argument is, ironically, very similar to an argument that Cartwright has put forward against the truth of universal laws of nature. The paper uses this insight to develop an account of causation that does justice to traditional views yet avoids the arguments of Russell.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 3 , July 2006 , pp. 261 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am very grateful to Michael Dickson, Michael Friedman, Timothy O'Connor, Pragati Jain, and several anonymous referees for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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