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Causal Irregularity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Fred I. Dretske  and
Aaron Snyder
Fred I. Dretske
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
Aaron Snyder
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , March 1972 , pp. 69 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © 1972 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

1 It is worth noticing that this doctrine is of great metaphysical importance, e.g. for the “Free Will” problem. Any attempt at analyzing causes as physically sufficient conditions of their effects—at least on most plausible lines—would seem to presuppose the truth of the Regularity Doctrine.

2 This example arose out of a discussion between A. Snyder and Professor H. J. Barr of the Department of Anatomy (University of Wisconsin).