Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T04:07:29.719Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Can a Constructive Empiricist Adopt the Concept of Observability?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

F. A. Muller
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Alan Musgrave, Michael Friedman, Jeffrey Foss, and Richard Creath raised different objections against the Distinction between observables and unobservables when drawn within the confines of Bas C. van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism (CE), to the effect that the Distinction cannot be drawn there coherently. Van Fraassen has only responded to Musgrave but Musgrave claimed not to understand van Fraassen's succinct response. I argue that van Fraassen's response is not enough. What remains in the end is an unsolved problem which CE cannot afford to leave unsolved, or so I argue; I then strengthen Musgrave's criticism and indicate that an extension of the epistemic policy of CE is mandatory to solve the problem. I also argue that Friedman's and Foss' objection against the Distinction in CE misses the mark on closer inspection. An objection due to Creath does hit the mark but can be taken care of without too much ado. All these objections seem alive and kicking until the present day; I try (and hope) to put them all to rest.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 1 , January 2004 , pp. 80 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

This paper has profited from remarks of D.G.B.J. Dieks, I.E. Douven, L. Henderson, J.B.M. Uffink, and two anonymous referees. I thank the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO), Philosophy and Theology Section, for financial support. I also thank A. Musgrave for unintendedly having triggered this paper.

References

Creath, Richard (1985), “Taking Theories Seriously”, Taking Theories Seriously 62:317–345.Google Scholar
Churchland, Paul M., and Hooker, Clifford A. (eds.) (1985), Images of Science. Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from B.C. van Fraassen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Foss, Jeffrey (1984), “On Accepting Van Fraassen's Image of Science”, On Accepting Van Fraassen's Image of Science 51:79–92.Google Scholar
Friedman, Michael (1982), review of The Scientific Image, by Bas C. van Fraassen, Journal of Philosophy 79:274–283.Google Scholar
Goodman, Nelson (1972), Problems and Projects. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1972.Google Scholar
Kukla, Andre (1998), Studies in Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.Google Scholar
Monton, Bradley, and van Fraassen, Bas C. (2003), “Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism”, Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism 54:405–422.Google Scholar
Muller, F. A. (2004), “The Deep Black Sea: Observability and Modality Afloat”, to appear in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55.Google Scholar
Musgrave, Alan (1985), “Constructive Empiricism and Realism”, in Churchland and Hooker 1985, 196–208.Google Scholar
Musgrave, Alan (2002), private communication, Popper Centenary Conference, Vienna, July 6, 2002.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980), The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1985), “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Science”, in Churchland and Hooker 1985, 245–308.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1993), “From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again”, in Hull, David, Forbes, Micky, and Okruhlik, Kathleen (eds.), PSA 1992, Vol. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 6–29.Google Scholar