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A. C. Michalos' “Postulates of Rational Preference”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

John D. Mullen
John D. Mullen*
Affiliation:
Boston University
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Extract

In an article in this journal [2], A. C. Michalos, while arguing for the normative and empirical inadequacy of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern (N-M) postulates of rational preference, completely misconstrued the concept of simple additivity contained in the (independence) postulates. As a result, the following argument is a non-sequitur.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 4 , December 1970 , pp. 618 - 619
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Aumann, R. J., “Subjective Programming,” in Shelly and Bryan (eds.) Human Judgments and Optimality, Wiley, New York, 1964.Google Scholar
[2] Michalos, A. C., “Postulates of Rational Preference,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 34, 1967.10.1086/288119CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, 1947.Google Scholar