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Brain-Mind and Structure-Function Relationships: A Methodological Response to Coltheart

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Adina L. Roskies
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Abstract

In some recent papers, Max Coltheart has questioned the ability of neuroimaging techniques to tell us anything interesting about the mind and has thrown down the gauntlet before neuroimagers, challenging them to prove he is mistaken. Here I analyze Coltheart's challenge, show that as posed its terms are unfair, and reconstruct it so that it is addressable. I argue that, so modified, Coltheart's challenge is able to be met and indeed has been met. In an effort to delineate the extent of neuroimaging's ability to address Coltheart's concerns, I explore how different brain structure-function relationships would constrain the ability of neuroimaging to provide insight about psychological questions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 5 , December 2009 , pp. 927 - 939
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This work was supported in part by an Australian Research Council fellowship at the University of Sydney. I would like to thank Max Coltheart for his correspondence and comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

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