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Backward-Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jordan Howard Sobel
Jordan Howard Sobel*
Affiliation:
Scarborough Campus, University of Toronto
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Abstract

According to a familiar argument, iterated prisoner's dilemmas of known finite lengths resolve for ideally rational and well-informed players: They would defect in the last round, anticipate this in the next to last round and so defect in it, and so on. But would they anticipate defections even if they had been cooperating? Not necessarily, say recent critics. These critics “lose” the backward-induction paradox by imposing indicative interpretations on rationality and information conditions. To regain it I propose subjunctive interpretations. To solve it I stress that implications for ordinary imperfect players are limited.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 114 - 133
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Allan Gibbard, Philip Pettit, Wiodek Rabinowicz, Willa Freeman-Sobel, and Robert Sugden for comments, and to an anonymous referee for insightful criticism and suggestions.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Scarborough Campus, University of Toronto, 1265 Military Trail, Scarborough, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada.

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