Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T00:17:54.516Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Autonomous Patterns and Scientific Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Katherine Brading
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Taking Bogen and Woodward's discussion of data and phenomena as his starting point, McAllister presents a challenge to scientific realism. I discuss this challenge and offer a suggestion for how the scientific realist could respond to both its epistemic and ontological aspects. In so doing, I urge that the scientific realist should not reject ontological pluralism from the start, but should seek to explore versions of scientific realism that leave open the possibility of certain kinds of pluralist ontology. I investigate the available options (in terms of foundationalism, reductionism, and universalism) and use a law-constitutive approach to offer a strategy for the scientific realist who is open-minded about ontological pluralism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 5 , December 2010 , pp. 827 - 839
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

In memory of my friend, Becky Bacon, and with grateful thanks to all those who supported me during PSA 2008. Thanks to McAllister, instigator and co-organizer of this symposium; to my fellow symposiasts; to the referees; and to all those who offered questions and comments at PSA 2008 and other venues where materials related to this paper have been presented. I am grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation (grant SES-0724383 Brading 201201).

References

Bogen, J., and Woodward, J.. 1988. “Saving the Phenomena.” Philosophical Review 97:303–52.10.2307/2185445CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brading, K. Forthcoming. “Newton's Law-Constitutive Approach to Bodies: A Response to Descartes.” In Interpreting Newton: Critical Essays, ed. Janiak, A. and Schliesser, E.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Brading, K., and Skiles, A.. n.d. “Underdetermination as a Path to Ontic Structural Realism.” Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Cartwright, N. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139167093CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castellani, E. 2002. “Reductionism, Emergence, and Effective Field Theories.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33:251–67.10.1016/S1355-2198(02)00003-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glymour, B. 2000. “Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered.” Erkenntnis 52:29–37.10.1023/A:1005499609332CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoefer, C. 2003. “For Fundamentalism.” Philosophy of Science 70:1401–12.10.1086/377417CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Massimi, M. 2007. “Saving Unobservable Phenomena.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58:235–62.10.1093/bjps/axm013CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McAllister, J. 1997. “Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets.” Erkenntnis 47:217–28.10.1023/A:1005387021520CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McAllister, J.. 2007. “Model Selection and the Multiplicity of Patterns in Empirical Data.” Philosophy of Science 74:884–94.10.1086/525630CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McAllister, J.. 2010. “The Ontology of Patterns in Empirical Data.” Philosophy of Science, in this issue.10.1086/656555CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrison, M., and Morgan, M., eds. 1999. Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Schindler, S. 2007. “Rehabilitating Theory: Refusal of the ‘Bottom-Up’ Construction of Scientific Phenomena.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38:160–84.10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sklar, L. 2003. “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World.” Philosophy of Science 70:424–41.10.1086/375476CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suppes, P. 1960. “A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences.” Synthese 12:287–301.10.1007/BF00485107CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suppes, P.. 1962. “Models of Data.” In Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Nagel, E., Suppes, P., and Tarski, A.. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Teller, P. 2004. “How We Dapple the World.” Philosophy of Science 71:425–47.10.1086/423625CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Teller, P.. 2010. “‘Saving the Phenomena’ Today.” Philosophy of Science, in this issue.10.1086/656537CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, B. 2002. The Empirical Stance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2010. “Data, Phenomena, Signal, and Noise.” Philosophy of Science, in this issue.10.1086/656554CrossRefGoogle Scholar