Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-01T17:10:06.207Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Appraising Models Nonrepresentationally

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Till Grüne-Yanoff
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Many scientific models lack an established representation relation to actual targets and instead refer to merely possible processes, background conditions, and results. This article shows how such models can be appraised. On the basis of the discussion of how-possibly explanations, five types of learning opportunities are distinguished. For each of these types, an example—from economics, biology, psychology, and sociology—is discussed. Contexts and purposes are identified in which the use of a model offers a genuine opportunity to learn. These learning opportunities offer novel justifications for modeling practices that fall between the cracks of standard representationalist appraisals of models.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 850 - 861
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ainslie, George. 2001. Breakdown of the Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ainslie, George 2009. “Recursive Self-Prediction in Self-Control and Its Failure.” In Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics, and Psychology, ed. Grüne-Yanoff, Till and Hansson, Sven Ove, 139–58. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
Axtell, Robert L., Epstein, Joshua M., Dean, Jeffrey S., Gumerman, George J., Swedlund, Alan C., Harburger, Jason, Chakravarty, Shubha, Hammond, Ross, Parker, Jon, and Parker, Miles. 2002. “Population Growth and Collapse in a Multiagent Model of the Kayenta Anasazi in Long House Valley.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (3): 7275–79..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cartwright, Nancy. 2009. “If No Capacities Then No Credible Worlds: But Can Models Reveal Capacities?” Erkenntnis 70 (1): 45–58..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dray, William H. 1957. Laws and Explanations in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Forber, Patrick. 2010. “Confirmation and Explaining How Possible.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (1): 32–40..CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Frigg, Roman, and Hartmann, Stephan. 2009. “Models in Science.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, Edward N.. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.Google Scholar
Giere, Ronald N. 1988. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grüne-Yanoff, Till. 2009. “Learning from Minimal Economic Models.” Erkenntnis 70 (1): 81–99..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grüne-Yanoff, Till. 2011 “Isolation Is Not Characteristic of Models.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2): 1–19..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Güth, Werner. 1995. “An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives.” International Journal of Game Theory 24:323–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hartmann, Stephan. 1995. “Models as a Tool for Theory Construction: Some Strategies of Preliminary Physics.” In Theories and Models in Scientific Process, ed. Herfel, William E., Krajewski, Wladyslaw, Niiniluoto, Ilkka, and Wojcicki, Ryszard, 49–67. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
Hausman, Daniel. M. 1992. The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holyoak, Keith, and Thagard, Paul. 1995. Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought. Cambridge, MA: Bradford.Google Scholar
Mäki, Uskali. 2009. “MISSing the World: Models as Isolations and Credible Surrogate Systems.” Erkenntnis 70 (1): 29–43..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reiner, Richard. 1993. “Necessary Conditions and Explaining How-Possibly.” Philosophical Quarterly 44 (170): 58–69..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Resnik, David B. 1991. “How-Possibly Explanations in Biology.” Acta Biotheoretica 39:141–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubinstein, Ariel. 2006. “Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist.” Econometrica 74 (4): 865–83..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C. 1971. “Dynamic Models of Segregation.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1 (2): 143–86..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, Robert. 2000. “Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economics.” Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (1): 1–31..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trivers, Robert L. 1971. “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” Quarterly Review of Biology 46:35–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraasen, Bas. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wimsatt, William. 2007. Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar