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Anti-Representationalism and the Dynamical Stance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Anthony Chemero
Anthony Chemero*
Affiliation:
Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Program, Franklin and Marshall College
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Program, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604–3003, USA; email: [email protected].
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Abstract

Arguments in favor of anti-representationalism in cognitive science often suffer from a lack of attention to detail. The purpose of this paper is to fill in the gaps in these arguments, and in so doing show that at least one form of anti-representationalism is potentially viable. After giving a teleological definition of representation and applying it to a few models that have inspired anti-representationalist claims, I argue that anti-representationalism must be divided into two distinct theses, one ontological, one epistemological. Given the assumptions that define the debate, I give reason to think that the ontological thesis is false. I then argue that the epistemological thesis might, in the end, turn out to be true, despite a potentially serious difficulty. Along the way, there will be a brief detour to discuss a controversy from early twentieth century physics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue 4 , December 2000 , pp. 625 - 647
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Bill Bechtel, Will Cordeiro, Mike Dunn, Michael Friedman, Ruth Millikan, Bob Port, Gregor Schöner, Brian Cantwell Smith, and Tim van Gelder for comments.

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