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Animal Cognition and Human Values
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
Animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of inductive risk since they must choose whether to affirm attributions of mental states to animals in advisory contexts, knowing their decisions hold consequences for animal welfare. In such contexts, the burden of proof should be sensitive to the consequences of error, but a framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof is lacking. Through reflection on two cases—pain and cognitive enrichment—I arrive at a tentative framework based on the principle of expected welfare maximization. I then discuss the limitations of this framework and the questions it leaves open.
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- Cognitive Sciences
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
This article is based on my contribution to the PSA Women’s Caucus Prize Symposium on Animal Cognition and Animal Welfare, held at the 25th biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association in Atlanta, November 3–6, 2016. I thank my fellow symposium participants (Marta Halina, Kristin Andrews, Colin Allen, and Lori Marino), the PSA Women’s Caucus for its support, and the audience members for their excellent questions and comments. I also thank Caroline Birch, Andrew Buskell, Marta Halina, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on the manuscript. This work was supported by a Philip Leverhulme Prize from the Leverhulme Trust.
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