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An Axiomatic Theory of Inductive Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Luciano Pomatto  and
Alvaro Sandroni
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Abstract

This article develops an axiomatic theory of induction that speaks to the recent debate on Bayesian orgulity. It shows the exact principles associated with the belief that data can corroborate universal laws. We identify two types of disbelief about induction: skepticism that the existence of universal laws of nature can be determined empirically, and skepticism that the true law of nature, if it exists, can be successfully identified. We formalize and characterize these two dispositions toward induction by introducing novel axioms for subjective probabilities. We also relate these dispositions to the (controversial) axiom of σ-additivity.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 85 , Issue 2 , April 2018 , pp. 293 - 315
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†.

We are grateful to Nabil Al-Najjar, Frederick Eberhardt, and Alvaro Riascos. All remaining errors are our own.

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