Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.
Send requests for reprints to Shaun Nichols, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston, 66 George St, Charleston, SC 29424.
We would like to thank Valerie Hardcastle, Anthony Marcel, Brian McLaughlin, Elizabeth Meny, Martin Perlmutter, Vic Peterson, Thomas Polger, Brian Scholl, and Lawrence Weiskrantz for discussion and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We would also like to thank two anonymous referees for very useful suggestions. This research was partly supported by NIH grant PHST32MH19975 (Nichols) and NSF grant SES-9818397 (Grantham).