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Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values” (i.e., Joycean credences). This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences (understood as “estimates of numerical truth-values” in Joyce's sense) should obey the probability calculus.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to thank Kenny Easwaran, Ben Levinstein, David Miller, Wolfgang Schwarz, Mike Titelbaum, Robbie Williams, and two anonymous referees of this journal for useful comments on earlier drafts.
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