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Accepting an Epistemically Inferior Alternative? A Comment on Elliott and McKaughan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Daniel Steel
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Abstract

Kevin Elliott and Dan McKaughan argue that, in some cases, nonepistemic values provide legitimate reasons for scientists to accept an epistemically inferior option, a claim that they support with two case studies. This essay argues that Elliott and McKaughan have not shown that their case studies are indeed ones in which an epistemically inferior option was accepted. Specifically, their interpretation of these cases depends on problematic premises that it is epistemically better to wait for a slower-but-more-reliable method than to accept the result of a quicker-but-less-reliable one and that a more detailed model is epistemically preferable to a simpler one.

Type
Discussion Note
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 83 , Issue 4 , October 2016 , pp. 606 - 612
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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