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Which Kind of Causal Specificity Matters Biologically?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Marcel Weber
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Abstract

Paul Griffiths et al. have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to assess various attempts to single out genetic causes as being causally more specific than other cellular mechanisms, for example, alternative splicing. Focusing in particular on developmental processes, they have identified a number of important challenges for this project. In this discussion note, I would like to show how these challenges can be met.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 3 , July 2017 , pp. 574 - 585
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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