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Whewell and Mill on Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Harold T. Walsh*
Affiliation:
Michigan State University

Abstract

Much of the Mill-Whewell dispute was purely verbal, but much was not. Mill did not understand Whewell; the true character of the non-verbal aspect of the controversy emerges only upon adequate analysis of Whewell's actual position. Such analysis shows that Mill's objections to Whewell were misdirected, although suggestive of other which might, if prosecuted, carry. Ultimately, the dispute has to do with the given; neither man gives an adequate account of it. For this reason, the controversy cannot be resolved definitively in favor of either of them.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1962

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Footnotes

1

This paper is based upon material which first appeared in my doctoral dissertation, The Philosophy of Science of William Whewell, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1960.

References

Whewell, W., Philosophy of Discovery (London: Parker, 60). PD.Google Scholar
Mill, J. S., A System of Logic, etc. SL.Google Scholar
The letters “PD” and “SL” in the references refer to these works, as shown.Google Scholar