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Vision, Perspectivism, and Haptic Realism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
In this article I examine the perceptual metaphor at the heart of perspectivism, discussing three elements: partiality, interestedness, and interaction. I argue that perspectivists should drop the visual metaphor in favor of a haptic one. Because the sense of touch requires contact and purposeful exploration on the part of the perceiver, it is obvious that with touch one apprehends an extradermal reality in virtue of and not in spite of its interactive and interested nature. By analogy, perspectivists should investigate the thesis that scientific representations inform us about the natural world in virtue of their interactive and interested qualities.
- Type
- Perspectivism
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I am much indebted to Michela Massimi for organizing the symposium on perspectivism, and to my fellow speakers, Ron Giere, Sandra Mitchell, and Paul Teller. I would also like to thank Jim Bogen and the symposium audience for numerous interesting questions, and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
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