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Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Peter Achinstein*
Affiliation:
The Johns Hopkins University

Abstract

Confirmation theorists seek to define a function that will take into account the various factors relevant in determining the degree to which an hypothesis is confirmed by its evidence. Among confirmation theorists, only Rudolf Carnap has constructed a system which purports to consider factors in addition to the number of instances, viz. the variety manifested by the instances and the amount of analogy between the instances. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the problem which these additional factors raise for confirmation theory, and to prove that, despite Carnap's claim, no confirmation function satisfying the requirements he has specified can take account of variety and analogy. This result is first proved for a special case, and then, in a subsequent section, is generalized through the introduction of a theorem (the proof of which is given in Appendix I). In the final section of the paper it is shown that, contrary to a claim which Carnap has made, not even the concept of the “logical width” of a predicate will enable confirmation functions satisfying his requirements to take adequate account of analogies between instances.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1963

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References

[1] Carnap, Rudolf. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952.Google Scholar
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[4] Keynes, J. M. A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan and Co., 1921.Google Scholar
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