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Theory Choice and the Intransitivity of ‘Is a Better Theory Than’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Peter Baumann
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Abstract

There is a very plausible transitivity principle for theory choice. It says that if all criteria of theory evaluation are considered, and theory A is a better theory than theory B, and theory B is a better theory than theory C, then A is a better theory than C. I argue against this principle. It turns out that whenever there are two or more relevant and independent criteria of theory evaluation, and that whenever at least of one the criteria is ‘nonlinear’ in a certain sense, there may be violations of transitivity that do not violate any standards of rationality (of theory choice). This shows, again, that theory choice cannot be seen as merely the application of given rules of rational theory choice.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 231 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank the following persons for comments and discussions: Gisela Cramer, Hugh Lacey, Abdul Raffert, Howard Sankey, and two anonymous referees.

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