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Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sungsu Kim
Sungsu Kim*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University
*
†Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409–3092; [email protected]
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Abstract

Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of brains that can provide evidence for or against multiple realizability.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue 4 , December 2002 , pp. 606 - 610
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I thank Elliott Sober, Frederick Suppe, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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