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A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

I. J. Good
I. J. Good*
Affiliation:
Department of Statistics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
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Extract

The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 1990 , pp. 535 - 536
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

This note is reproduced from a recent issue of the Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation, with the permission of the editor and of the publishers, Gordon and Breach.

†

This work was supported in part from a grant from N.I.H.

References

Good, I. J. (1985), “Probabilistic Induction Is Inevitable”, C216 in Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation 20: 323–324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R. and Miller, D. W. (1983), “A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability”, Nature 302: 687–688; 310 (1984): 434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R. and Miller, D. W. (1987), “Why Probabilistic Support Is Not Inductive”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London A 321: 569–591.Google Scholar