Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T08:26:37.321Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Status of the D-Thesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Philip L. Quinn
Philip L. Quinn*
Affiliation:
Brown University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Some of the controversy surrounding the Duhemian claim that in science falsification is as inconclusive as verification is reconsidered. The D-Thesis, a particular version of this claim first discussed by Adolf Grünbaum, is formulated in a more precise and perspicuous fashion as a conjunction of two subtheses. Grünbaum's attempt to refute one of the subtheses by means of a geometrical counterexample and some subsequent discussions of this example are examined critically. An argument designed to prove the other subthesis is analyzed and shown to be unsuccessful. It is concluded that the D-Thesis is as yet neither proven nor refuted.

Type
A Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , December 1969 , pp. 381 - 399
Copyright
Copyright © 1969 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

[1] Duhem, P., The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Atheneum, New York, 1962.Google Scholar
[2] Grünbaum, A., Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, Knopf, New York, 1963.Google Scholar
[3] Grünbaum, A., “Law and Convention in Physical Theory,” Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science (eds. Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G.), Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1961.Google Scholar
[4] Grünbaum, A., “The Falsifiability of a Component of a Theoretical System,” Mind, Matter and Method (eds. Feyerabend, P. K. and Maxwell, G.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966.Google Scholar
[5] Grünbaum, A., Geometry and Chronometry in Philosophical Perspective, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1968.Google Scholar
[6] Grünbaum, A., “Can We Ascertain the Falsity of a Scientific Hypothesis?,” A Thalheimer Lecture, delivered at the Johns Hopkins University on May 9, 1969 and to be published in Studium Generale, Vol. 22 (1969).Google ScholarPubMed
[7] Hesse, Mary, “Review of Mind, Matter and Method,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 18, 1968, pp. 330–335.Google Scholar
[8] Post, E., “Formal Reductions of the General Combinatorial Decision Problem,” American Journal of Mathematics, vol. 65, 1943, pp. 197–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[9] Quine, W. V. O., “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” From a Logical Point of View, Harper & Row, New York, 1963.Google Scholar
[10] Sklar, L., “The Falsifiability of Geometric Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64, 1967, pp. 247–253.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[11] Swanson, J. W., “On the D-Thesis,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 34, 1967, pp. 59–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[12] Watanabe, S., Knowing and Guessing, John Wiley, New York, 1969.Google Scholar