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Speech Act Theory and the Multiple Aims of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul L. Franco
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Abstract

I draw on speech act theory to understand the speech acts appropriate to the multiple aims of scientific practice and the role of nonepistemic values in evaluating speech acts made relative to those aims. First, I consider work that distinguishes explanatory speech acts from descriptive speech acts within scientific practice. I then show how speech act theory provides a framework to make sense of explaining’s and describing’s distinct felicity conditions. Finally, I argue that if explaining aims to convey understanding to particular audiences rather than describe literally across contexts, then evaluating explanatory speech acts directed to nonscientists involves nonepistemic criteria.

Type
Ethics, Values, and Social Epistemology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 5 , December 2019 , pp. 1005 - 1015
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to the students in my Science and Values class in fall 2017, especially Abbey Willman for writing a term paper that touched on the topic here; the Philosophy of Science Reading Group at the University of hington; the audience at PSA 2018; Kevin Elliott; and Erin Kendig for helpful discussion and suggestions that improved the article.

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