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Species, Historicity, and Path Dependency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

This paper clarifies the historical nature of species by showing that species are path-dependent entities. A species’ identity is not determined by its intrinsic properties or its origin, but by its unique evolutionary path. Seeing that species are path-dependent entities has three implications: it shows that origin essentialism is mistaken, it rebuts two challenges to the species-are-historical-entities thesis, and it demonstrates that the identity of a species during speciation depends on future events.

Type
Biological Sciences
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Thanks to John Beatty, Eric Desjardins, Travis Dumsday, Laura Franklin-Hall, Matt Haber, Makmiller Pedroso, Thomas Reydon, Elliott Sober, Derek Turner, and Joel Velasco for their help on this project. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided financial support.

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