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Some Questions about Identifying Individuals: Failed Intuitions about Organisms and Species

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Christopher D. Horvath
Christopher D. Horvath*
Affiliation:
Departments of Philosophy and Biology, Illinois State University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61790-4540.
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Abstract

Treating species as individuals and not classes has been crucial to the integration of evolutionary theory with modern systematics. Despite the theoretically important role the concept of individuality plays in modern phylogenetic systematics and in evolutionary theory more generally, many have been content to rely on common-sense intuitions about what counts as an individual. One of the most often cited intuitions is that individuals should be defined intrinsically. Unfortunately, common-sense intuitions like this one have proven to be inadequate for identifying and characterizing historical individuals (like species). An examination of real-world biological examples shows that our common-sense intuitions are equally inadequate when applied to at least some biological organisms—the paradigm individuals.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , December 1997 , pp. 654 - 668
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank David Hull, Philip Kitcher, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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