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Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

J. D. Trout
J. D. Trout*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department and the Parmly Hearing Institute, Loyola University Chicago
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Philosophy Department and the Parmly Hearing Institute, Loyola University Chicago, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626; [email protected].
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Abstract

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue 2 , June 2002 , pp. 212 - 233
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks are due to Paul Abela, Michael Bishop, Richard Farr, Robert Klee, and Joseph Mendola for very helpful comments on this paper. I especially want to thank Dwayne Mulder for early conversations and arguments with me about the nature and function of explanation.

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