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Science, Biases, and the Threat of Global Pessimism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

K. Brad Wray
K. Brad Wray*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, 1866 Main Mall, E-370, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T 1Z1, Canada.
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Abstract

Philip Kitcher rejects the global pessimists' view that the conclusions reached in inquiry are determined by the interests of some segment of the population, arguing that only some inquiries, for example, inquiries into race and gender, are adversely affected by interests. I argue that the biases Kitcher believes affect such inquiries are operative in all domains, but the prevalence of such biases does not support global pessimism. I argue further that in order to address the global pessimists' concerns, the scientific community needs criticism from people with diverse interests and background assumptions.

Type
Science and Values
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S467 - S478
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

Each of the following provided me with feedback on this paper: Lori Nash, Marc Ereshefsky, Kristina Rolin, David Davies, Mark Migotti, Bob Ware, Melinda Hogan, and Sergio Sismondo. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Philosophy Departments at St. Mary's University, East Tennessee State University, and the University of British Columbia, and at the annual conference of the Canadian Philosophical Association, and the Biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.

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