Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
This essay explores some of the issues raised as regards the relations of philosophy and sociology of science in the work of Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. It argues that Hans Reichenbach's distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification should not be seen as erecting a principled normative/descriptive distinction that demarcates philosophy of science from sociology of science. The essay also raises certain issues about the role of volition, decision, and the limits of epistemological concern in the work of Carnap and Reichenbach and in some recent sociology of science. The relations of philosophy of science to sociology of science are seen to be more deeply rooted and more interesting than the Science Warriors would have us believe.
A previous version of this essay was read in a symposium on logical empiricism and sociology of science at the Philosophy of Science Association Meeting in Kansas City. I am grateful to my co-symposiasts, Thomas Uebel and Elisabeth Nemeth, the session chair, Richard Creath, and the audience, especially Robert S. Cohen, Michael Friedman, Don Howard, Paul Roth, and Friedrich Stadler, for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Stephen Straker, Ernie Hamm, and Judy Segal for discussions of the topic of this essay and of the nature of Science Studies generally.