Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T15:56:49.688Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reason, Judgement and Bayes's Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Harold I. Brown
Harold I. Brown*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper argues that when used judiciously Bayes's law has a role to play in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. Several examples are presented in which a rational response to evidence requires a judgement whether to apply Bayes's law or whether, for example, to redistribute prior probabilities. The paper concludes that reflection on Bayes's law illustrates how an adequate account of the rational evaluation of hypotheses requires an account of judgement—a point which several philosophers have noted despite few attempts to develop an adequate theory of judgement.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 61 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 351 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I want to thank C. A. Hooker and an anonymous Philosophy of Science referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

References

Berger, J. O. (1985), Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. 2d ed. New York: Springer-Verlag.10.1007/978-1-4757-4286-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, H. I. (1978), “On Being Rational”, American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 241–248.Google Scholar
Brown, H. I. (1988), Rationality. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Brown, H. I. and Hooker, C. A. (1994), Beyond Formalism: A Naturalistic Theory of Reason. In progress.Google Scholar
Earman, J. (1992), Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Edwards, W.; Lindman, H.; and Savage, L. (1963), “Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research”, Psychological Review 70: 193–242.10.1037/h0044139CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eells, E. (1990), “Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence”, in Savage, C. W., (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 14, Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 205–223.Google Scholar
Elster, J. (1983), Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139171694CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garber, D. (1983), “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, in Earman, J., (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 10, Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 99–131.Google Scholar
Glymour, C. (1980), Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Good, I. J. (1983), “46656 Varieties of Bayesians”, in Good Thinking. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 20–21.Google Scholar
Howson, C. (1990), “Fitting Your Theory to the Facts: Probably Not Such a Bad Thing After All”, in Savage, C. W., (ed), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 14, Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 224–244.Google Scholar
Howson, C. (1991), “The ‘Old Evidence’ Problem”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42: 547–555.10.1093/bjps/42.4.547CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. (1989), Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, R. (1983), “Bayesian with a Human Face”, in Earman, J., (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 10, Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 133–156.Google Scholar
Lindley, D. V. (1976), “Bayesian Statistics”, in Harper, W. L. and Hooker, C. A., (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science: Proceedings of an International Research Colloquium Held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 10–13 May 1973. Vol. 2, Foundations and Philosophy of Statistical Inference. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 353–363.10.1007/978-94-010-1436-6_10CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lipton, P. (1992), Review of C. Howson and P. Urbach's Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. Mind 101: 171–175.Google Scholar
Lugg, A. (1985), “The Process of Discovery”, Philosophy of Science 52: 207–220.10.1086/289240CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newton-Smith, W. (1981), The Rationality of Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.10.4324/9780203317211CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Niiniluoto, I. (1983), “Novel Facts and Bayesianism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34: 375–379.10.1093/bjps/34.4.375CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511625398CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, W. C. (1966), “The Foundations of Scientific Inference”, in Colodny, R. G., (ed.), Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 135–275.Google Scholar
Salmon, W. C. (1988), “Dynamic Rationality, Propensity, Probability, and Credence”, in Fetzer, J., (ed.), Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 3–40.10.1007/978-94-009-3997-4_1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, W. C. (1990), “Rationality and Objectivity in Science or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes”, in Savage, W. C., (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 14, Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 175–204.Google Scholar
Salmon, W. C. (1991), “The Appraisal of Theories: Kuhn Meets Bayes”, in Fine, A., Forbes, M., and Wessels, L., (eds.), PSA 1990, vol. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 325–332.Google Scholar
Savage, L. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
Shimony, A. (1970), “Scientific Inference”, in Colodny, R., (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories., Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 79–172.Google Scholar
Suppes, P. (1966), “Concept Formation and Bayesian Decisions”, in Hintikka, J. and Suppes, P., (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic., Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 21–48.10.1016/S0049-237X(08)71661-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suppes, P. (1984), Probabilistic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wartofsky, M. (1980), “Scientific Judgment: Creativity and Discovery in Scientific Thought”, in Nickles, T., (ed.), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies., Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–20.Google Scholar