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Quantum Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Allen Ginsberg
Allen Ginsberg*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , September 1981 , pp. 487 - 491
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author thanks Dr. Robert Weingard for helpful suggestions concerning various details of the argument of this paper.

References

REFERENCES

Barnette, R. L. (1978), “Does Quantum Mechanics Disprove The Principle of The Identity of Indiscernibles?”, Philosophy of Science 45: 466–470.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cortes, A. (1976), “Leibniz's Principle of The Identity of Indiscernibles: A False Principle”, Philosophy of Science 43: 491–505.CrossRefGoogle Scholar