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The Probability of Particular Events

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

R. G. Swinburne
R. G. Swinburne*
Affiliation:
University of Hull
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Extract

The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let ‘α‘ denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q/α) the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q/α). This view is shown not to be generally true, but to provide a useful approximation in many cases. Then given that we have information about the observed frequencies of Q among objects having one or more of the properties whose conjunction forms α, the paper shows how to establish which value of P(Q/α) is the best confirmed one.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , September 1971 , pp. 327 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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