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Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Brad Armendt
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Abstract

Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory should model them. I explore the idea and how it relates to work on imprecise probabilities and second-order confidence.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 758 - 768
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to audiences at the EpiConFor Workshop in Nancy and at the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh for discussion of earlier versions of this article. Particular thanks to Rich Thomason, Mark Wilson, Teddy Seidenfeld, Jim Joyce, Darrell Rowbottom, Bob Batterman, and Paul Teller for helpful conversations about topics raised here.

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