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Piecewise versus Total Support: How to Deal with Background Information in Likelihood Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Benjamin C. Jantzen
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Abstract

The use of the Law of Likelihood (LL) as a general tool for assessing rival hypotheses has been criticized for its ambiguous treatment of background information. The LL endorses radically different answers depending on what information is designated as background versus evidence. I argue that once one distinguishes between two questions about evidentiary support, the ambiguity vanishes. I demonstrate this resolution by applying it to a debate over the status of the ‘fine-tuning argument’.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 313 - 331
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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