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Philosophy of Science Naturalized

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ronald N. Giere
Ronald N. Giere*
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University
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Abstract

In arguing a “role for history,“ Kuhn was proposing a naturalized philosophy of science. That, I argue, is the only viable approach to the philosophy of science. I begin by exhibiting the main general objections to a naturalistic approach. These objections, I suggest, are equally powerful against nonnaturalistic accounts. I review the failure of two nonnaturalistic approaches, methodological foundationism (Carnap, Reichenbach, and Popper) and metamethodology (Lakatos and Laudan). The correct response, I suggest, is to adopt an “evolutionary perspective.” This perspective is defended against one recent critic (Putnam). To argue the plausibility of a naturalistic approach, I next sketch a naturalistic account of theories and of theory choice. This account is then illustrated by the recent revolution in geology. In conclusion I return to Kuhn's question about the role of history in developing a naturalistic theory of science.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 331 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The support of the National Science Foundation is hereby gratefully acknowledged. My colleagues at Indiana and a reviewer supplied many helpful suggestions.

References

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