¹ The present paper is the third of a series dealing with logical positivism, pragmatism, and scientific empiricism. The two preceding papers appear in the Proceedings of the VIIIth International Congress, and in Erkenntnis, vol. 5, 1935.

² Unity of Science, 22. A useful survey in English is found in Philosophy and Logical Syntax. In German a survey is given in Wissenschaftslogik, and a detailed presentation in Logische Syntax der Sprache.

³ Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 7. Cf., Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, 1934, 9; Erkenntnis, vol. 2, 1932, 238.

⁴ Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 99.

⁵ Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 72.

⁶ Thus, Erkenntnis, vol. 2, 1932, 236: “Ein Satz besagt nur das, was an ihm verifizierbar ist.”

⁷ See especially the statement on pages 56–57 of Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Cf. Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, 1934, 12. The implication of this shift for the problem of truth is obvious: it involves passing from a correspondence view to a form of coherence view, i.e., a true proposition is simply one compatible with or unifiable with the accepted propositions of a science. The evolution in the views of truth is discussed in an article by C. G. Hempel, “On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth”, in Analysis, vol. 2, 1935. This shift is the price paid for neglecting other aspects of meaning than the formal when certain difficulties in the earlier empirical formulations of meaning were encountered.

⁸ Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 83. Cf. Unity of Science, 25.

⁹ Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 84.

¹⁰ This is particularly true if it be recognized that the formal sciences are merely a part of empirical science. Although analytic and synthetic propositions may be distinguished, the determination of the status of a given proposition or the determination of what propositions really do follow from others according to specified transformation rules are of course empirical in that observation upon symbols is involved. See my article, “The Relation of the Formal and Empirical Sciences within Scientific Empiricism,” Erkenntnis, vol. 5, 1935.

¹¹ Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 9.

¹² Ibid., 24–25.

¹³ “Logic and Pragmatism,” Contemporary American Philosophy, vol. 2, 48.

¹⁴ “The Future of Philosophy,” Proceedings of the VIIth International Congress of Philosophy, 116.

¹⁵ This is especially true of Schlick. See Les énoncés scientifiques et la réalité du monde extérieur, 24 (“Bref, l'indication des conditions dans lesquelles une proposition est vraie se confond avec l'indication de son sens. Il est tout à fait inutile de chercher plus loin”). His article “Facts and Propositions” (Analysis, vol. 2, 1935) is an explicit defense of empiricism against the newer formalistic extremes. In my opinion this resurgence of formalism—empiricism controversies is an evidence that the Wiener Kreis has no sufficiently general theory of meaning.

¹⁶ If indeed the meaning of a proposition is all that can be deduced from it by both logical principles and scientific laws the fitness of the philosopher to determine meanings is by no means clear.

¹⁷ Les énoncés scientifiques, etc., 13–14; Proceedings of the VIIth International Congress of Philosophy, 113–114.

¹⁸ Philosophy and Civilization, 329.

¹⁹ Dewey often states this in extreme form: “Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth, and philosophy is concerned with meaning rather than with truth” (ibid., 4); “the scientific factor, the element of correctness, of verifiable applicability, has a place, but it is a negative one” (ibid., 10).

²⁰ A Common Faith, 79.

²¹ Philosophy and Civilization, 3–4.

²² It is not uncommon to find “scientific” philosophers looking down upon Dewey's work. For the most part they fail to see that they are merely dealing with different aspects of science and with different dimensions of meaning. Scientists should not misunderstand those who have accepted science to the hilt, who see its cultural implications, and who are concerned with the existence of a society in which science and scientists may continue to live!

²³ The epistemological aspects of the problem are considered in an article, “Pragmatism and Metaphysics,” Philosophical Review, vol. 43, 1934.

²⁴ Process and Reality, 4. The term “necessary” is for our purposes unnecessary.

²⁵ Ibid., 15–16.

²⁶ Ibid., 8.

²⁷ Ibid., 12.

²⁸ As given in the Principle: “Rule III. The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intension nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever. Rule IV. In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.” Needless to say, Newton did not follow these principles in his own philosophy—and the results speak for themselves.

²⁹ See Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 15–16.

³⁰ It would be interesting to consider cases where philosophers have actually broken ground for science—such as Democritus and atomism; Cusanus and relativity of motion; Leibniz and unified mathematics and science; Peirce, James, Reichenbach and objective indeterminism. The final rejection or vindication of such insights is of course important and laborious—but this should not lead to a condemnation of insights as such, especially when they are of such a type as to be empirically controllable.

³¹ Process and Reality, 25–26.

³² “Whatever is found in ‘practice’ must lie within the scope of the metaphysical description. When the description fails to include the ‘practice,‘ the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. … Metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice.” (Process and Reality, 19).