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Perceptual Symbols and Taxonomy Comparison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Xiang Chen
Xiang Chen*
Affiliation:
California Lutheran University
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, California Lutheran University, Thousand Oaks, CA 91360–2787; email: [email protected].
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Abstract

Many recent cognitive studies reveal that human cognition is inherently perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both the conceptual and the neural levels. This paper introduces Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbols and explores its implications for philosophy of science. If perceptual symbols lie in the heart of conceptual processing, the process of attribute selection during concept representation, which is critical for defining similarity and thus for comparing taxonomies, can no longer be determined solely by background beliefs. The analogous nature of perceptual symbols and the spatial nature of intraconceptual relations impose new constraints on attribute selection. These constraints help people with different background beliefs select compatible attributes, which constitute a common “platform” for taxonomy comparison.

Type
Theory-Ladeness and the Neurology of Perception
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S200 - S212
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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