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Paradigmatic Experiments: The Ultimatum Game from Testing to Measurement Device

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Francesco Guala
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Abstract

The Ultimatum Game is one of the most successful experimental designs in the history of the social sciences. In this article I try to explain this success—what makes it a “paradigmatic experiment”—stressing in particular its versatility. Despite the intentions of its inventors, the Ultimatum Game was never a good design to test economic theory, and it is now mostly used as a heuristic tool for the observation of nonstandard preferences or as a “social thermometer” for the observation of culture-specific norms.

Type
Philosophical Issues in Experimental Economics
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2008 , pp. 658 - 669
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Marcel Boumans, Margaret Schabas, Bob Sugden, and various members of the audience at Philosophy of Science Association 2006 meeting offered very useful comments and suggestions. All remaining mistakes are mine.

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