Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
This paper defends the relevance of Taylor's (1964) critique of S-R behaviorism to Skinner's model of operant conditioning. In particular, it is argued against Ringen (1976) that the model of operant conditioning is a nonteleological variety of explanation. Operant conditioning is shown unable, on this account, to provide a parsimonious and predictive explanation of the behavior of higher level organisms. Finally, it is shown that the principle of operant conditioning implicitly assumes a teleological capacity, the admission of which renders the principle of operant conditioning superfluous.
I would like to thank the following members of the Sociology Department of Temple University for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper: Kyriakos Kontopoulos, John Houghton, Gary Klein and, especially, Lynne Kotranski. I would also like to express appreciation for the comments of an anonymous reviewer.